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THE DEVELOPMENT AND FAILURE OF
SOCIAL NORMS IN SECOND LIFE
PHILLIP STOUP†
ABSTRACT
This Note analyzes the development and efficacy of social norms
in maximizing the welfare of participants in the virtual community of
Second Life. Although some of these norms developed appropriately
in response to the objectives and purposes of this virtual world,
Second Life is so thoroughly steeped in conditions that have impeded
the development of successful social norms in other communities that
any system of social norms in Second Life will ultimately fail.
Because social norms will likely fail to successfully maximize resident
welfare, regulatory schemes imposed both by the operators of the
virtual world and by real-world governing institutions are needed to
enhance the functioning of this particular alternative reality inhabited
by millions.

INTRODUCTION
Beliefs lawyers hold about computers, and predictions they make
about new technology, are highly likely to be false. This should
make us hesitate to prescribe legal adaptations for cyberspace. The
1
blind are not good trailblazers.

Despite Judge Frank Easterbrook’s admonition, for over two
decades lawyers and legal scholars have debated the role, presence,
and effect of real-world regulations on the internet and property in
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cyberspace. For ease of understanding, this ongoing debate can be
divided into two opposing viewpoints on how real-world legal rules
and regulations should affect the internet and virtual property: first, a
camp of “exceptionalists” who believe that cyberspace is
fundamentally distinct from the real world and thus should be subject
to a different set of rules, and second, a camp of “unexceptionalists”
who believe that cyberspace is no different from the real world and
2
should be governed by the same regulations.
Out of this debate between the exceptionalists and the
unexceptionalists emerged a middle ground: the theory of “Code is
Law” recognizes both the validity of cyberspace as a distinct world
3
regulated by the computer code that defines it, and the theory
acknowledges a need for some level of real-world regulations to
protect the virtual world from infractions its regulating computer
4
code cannot prevent. This theory, formulated primarily by Professor
Lawrence Lessig, can be further illustrated by analogizing the balance
between computer code and real-world law to a farmer installing
5
fences around a field. There, the fencing operates like the computer
code: it stops potential intruders from accessing the farmer’s land by
making access to the land impossible where the fence bars the way.
Like computer code that can be hacked or manipulated, however, a
trespasser can climb over the fence or cut through its barbed wire.
Therefore, society needs laws and rules like the tort of trespass to
6
protect further the farmer’s land when the fence fails. In cyberspace
this interplay between computer code–created rules and real-world
regulation presents two questions, which are further explored in this
Note. First, if there is to be a mix between code-created rules and
real-world regulations, what is the optimal combination? And second,
if code-created rules are to at least partially govern the internet and

2. Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210, 213–14 (2007).
3. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, at 83–84 (2006) (“Life in cyberspace is
regulated primarily through the [computer] code of cyberspace. . . . Regulated in the sense that
bars on a prison regulate the movement of a prisoner, or regulated in the sense that stairs
regulate the access of the disabled. Code is a regulator in cyberspace because it defines the
terms upon which cyberspace is offered.”).
4. Greg Lastowka, Decoding Cyberproperty, 40 IND. L. REV. 23, 59–60 (2007).
5. LESSIG, supra note 3, at 169–71.
6. Lastowka, supra note 4, at 60 (agreeing with Lessig that “the correct solution would not
depend wholly upon technology, but would mix some degree of private fencing and some
degree of trespass law”).
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cyberspace, who is best positioned to create these new governing
7
laws?
The optimal mix between code-created rules and real-world
regulations could be determined by finding the “mix that provides
8
optimal protection at the lowest cost.” Put differently, the
determination of what norms ought to be used in cyberspace should
be guided by the consideration of what norms will maximize the
9
participants’ welfare. This economic-minded analysis is not a call for
10
a uniform set of norms to be applied to the internet as a whole.
Instead, whatever norms that a society employs must necessarily be
highly tailored to the context in which they are applied. Therefore,
the first step in determining what norms should be used is to ascertain
11
the potential objectives of the cyberspace being regulated. The
second step, in light of those objectives, is to choose the rules that
maximize the welfare of the various participants in this particular area
12
of cyberspace. This highly tailored approach to rule creation in
cyberspace may also require rules to be created by small communities
that are intimately associated with the objectives of the portion of
cyberspace being regulated. This microapproach to rule propagation
suggests that social norms created by individual communities may be
the most efficient approach to rule creation in cyberspace.
Even if the above assertions are correct and lead to optimal
welfare maximization, they are meaningless if the parties choosing the
mix are irrational, if there exist inefficiencies barring an effective
negotiation, or if other transaction costs are so high that it is

7. See LESSIG, supra note 3, at 6–8 (identifying the choice of government and checks on
that government as questions that should be answered). Lessig implied a desire for the users of
the internet to create governing rules. He feared that the special interests of government would
be ill suited to promulgate efficient regulating norms. Id. But see Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex
Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 553, 587 (1998) (arguing that code-created regulations should be harnessed in the service
of state and regulatory interests).
8. LESSIG, supra note 3, at 169.
9. Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the
Whaling Industry, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 84 (1989).
10. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 169 (1991) (“The hypothesis of welfare maximizing norms is not a blanket normative
recommendation that social controllers use norms as rules.”).
11. See JOHN P. DWYER & PETER S. MENELL, PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY: A
COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 59–60 (1998) (suggesting by way of example a
method for analyzing social norms in a community).
12. See id. (explaining and applying the suggested two-step process for analyzing social
norms in a community).
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impossible to develop a system of norms that will regulate the
13
participants in such a way that their welfare is maximized efficiently.
This Note analyzes one area of cyberspace, the virtual world of
14
Second Life, to determine whether the mix of code-created rules and
real-world regulation is maximizing the participants’ welfare.
Additionally, this Note analyzes and compares the efficacy of norms
being created by Second Life participants who are intimately close to
its objectives against the norms being developed by the world’s
creators or some real-world regulatory body.
To determine if the norms in Second Life are efficient, several
legal theorists’ observations regarding the emergence and efficacy of
15
social norms in other communities will be used as a framework. To
establish the first component of this framework, this Note surveys the
conditions affecting the treatment of property in these other
communities and analyzes the policies and objectives of those
communities. The second component of this framework is established
by comparing the conditions, policies, and objectives that gave rise to
the social norms in these other communities with the conditions
giving rise to the emerging norms in Second Life. This comparison
illuminates the efficacy of social norms in Second Life.
Although Second Life seems to be an ideal environment for
social norms to maximize participants’ total welfare given the overall
16
objective of this virtual world, the conditions of this virtual reality
make social norms alone an inefficient vehicle to maximize the
participants’ well-being. Part I of this Note describes the virtual world
of Second Life and differentiates it from other cyber realities. Part II
compares the objectives that gave rise to successful social norms in
other small communities to some of the objectives that inspired the
social norms that have developed in Second Life. Part III shows that
conditions in Second Life are not conducive to social norms operating
efficiently. Finally, to best allocate property rights within the virtual
community and to guide real-world courts and regulators in resolving

13. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 347–50
(1967).
14. See infra Part I (describing the video game-like world of Second Life where people can
interact with each other and the cyber-landscape in a virtual three-dimensional setting).
15. See generally JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE (1988) (revealing
the complex web of relationships affecting lobster fishermen); Ellickson, supra note 9, at 84
(“This essay advances the hypothesis that when people are situated in a close-knit group, they
will tend to develop for the ordinary run of problems norms that are wealth-maximizing.”).
16. See infra Part I.
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virtual-world disputes, Part IV recommends combining real-world
regulation with the code-based regulation in the virtual world. In
conclusion, this Note observes that lessons learned from this analysis
of Second Life can be extrapolated to other virtual realities and other
online communities in an attempt to better maximize cyber residents’
welfare.
I. DESCRIPTION OF SECOND LIFE
Second Life, created by the California-based corporation Linden
Lab, is a virtual world in which users can interact with each other in a
17
18
three-dimensional setting. Unlike other popular virtual worlds,
Second Life does not focus on a story or some overarching quest that
19
unites its users. Instead, Second Life is simply a forum in which
people, through virtual representations known as “avatars,” can
interact with each other and engage in general commerce through the
20
production, sale, and acquisition of virtual goods.
21
Second Life as a world is often referred to as the “grid.” The
world of Second Life is referred to as the grid because its virtual
landscape is nothing more than a patchwork of individual regions
22
called “Sims,” which is short for simulators. These regions each
cover an area of 65,536 virtual square meters and are often
subdivided into smaller parcels, which residents can purchase for their
23
own use. The grid is aptly described as a patchwork of Sims because
each Sim is unique. For instance, some Sims are devoted to building
activities and include vast empty areas where residents can build

17. Cory Ondrejka, Collapsing Geography: Second Life, Innovation, and the Future of
National Power, INNOVATIONS, Summer 2007, at 27, 30 (describing Second Life as a simulated
world, roughly the size of Singapore, with approximately seven million users).
18. Other virtual worlds include World of Warcraft, Eve Online, Sims Online and
Everquest.
19. By contrast, the participants in the online multiplayer game World of Warcraft are
united through the gameplay elements of engaging in various quests that increase the users’
virtual characters’ abilities and wealth. World of Warcraft Guide, http://www.worldofwarcraft.
com/info/basics/guide.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
20. Second Life, What is Second Life?, http://secondlife.com/whatis (last visited Oct. 10,
2008).
21. MICHAEL RYMASZEWSKI ET AL., SECOND LIFE: THE OFFICIAL GUIDE 366 (2d ed.
2008).
22. Id. at 6. The name derives from the fact that each region was originally
compartmentalized on its own server. Id.
23. See id. at 33 (setting out the fees per area).
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24

objects. Other Sims are geared toward providing residents an area
25
where they can engage in combat. Some Sims are dedicated to the
special interests of a specific group of residents in Second Life and
include massive buildings where the group can meet and discuss their
26
common interests. Many Sims are even dedicated solely to providing
27
Second Life residents a means to earn Linden dollars.
How each Sim is used is largely determined by the owners of that
Sim. The owners of the Sim can shape how it is used by creating codebased rules which will automatically prohibit certain behaviors the
owners do not want occurring on their virtual land. For example, if
the owners of a Sim do not want visitors to create objects while
visiting their virtual property, the owners will select in the interface
controlling the properties of their virtual land the option disallowing
28
visitors to build objects. After the owners select this option, visitors
to their virtual land will not be able to select the control menu that
allows them to build objects, thus visitors will be unable to create
29
objects. This method of control is an example of computer code–
based regulation governing how residents interact and behave in a
Sim by establishing what behavior is possible.
Another way that operators of a Sim can control how their
virtual property is used is through establishing ground rules for how
users can interact while on the operator’s land. These ground rules
30
can be made public to visitors when they enter the virtual land. If
24. See id. at 267 (describing such Sims as “sandboxes”).
25. See PAUL CARR & GRAHAM POND, THE UNOFFICIAL TOURISTS’ GUIDE TO SECOND
LIFE 79–82 (2007) (describing the history of “Jessie,” a no-holds-barred combat Sim).
Residents’ avatars cannot be “killed” permanently. Instead, when avatars are slain they are
kicked off the Sim where they died and are reincarnated at a point they designate as their home.
See id. at 81 (mentioning this process).
26. See id. at 85 (describing a Sim called “Luskwood,” where a popular group known as
“Furries” congregate).
27. See RYMASZEWSKI ET AL., supra note 21, at 285 (discussing “camping” jobs that pay
residents solely for their presence). A Sim called “Money Island,” one of the most frequently
visited Sims in Second Life, is an area of the virtual world where residents can make money
simply by participating in short surveys. See Screenshot No. 1 (on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (showing an avatar standing in front of a sign advertising how a resident could earn
money by participating in a survey).
28. RYMASZEWSKI ET AL., supra note 21, at 35 & fig.2.6 (showing how owners can control
their virtual property by selecting options in the “About Land” panel). Some of the options
users can select include “restricting access [to the land], issuing permission to run scripts, playing
music, [and] banning specific residents.” Id. at 35.
29. Screenshot No. 2 (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (showing in the upper left corner
of the user interface screen an icon indicating that an avatar cannot build in that Sim).
30. For a description of some visitor-use restrictions, see infra notes 101–04 and
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any of the ground rules are broken, other residents can report the
violation to the owners of the virtual property and the owners can
remove, and even bar, the offending visitor from ever visiting their
31
virtual land again.
One of the central tenets of Second Life is that its virtual world is
created and owned by the residents and users who actively contribute
32
to the world’s content on a daily basis. One way Second Life
residents can contribute to the world’s content is by creating objects.
Users can create objects in Second Life by using a relatively simple
three-dimensional graphics-creation software embedded in the
33
game’s interface. By using this interface, users can create objects
ranging from houses to rocket ships and from televisions to
34
holographic projectors.
Through the object-creation system
residents can even create the clothes and body parts that their avatars
35
can “wear” to change their appearances. To promote this active
production of user-created content, Linden Lab gave its residents
ownership over any virtual property they created or acquired in
36
Second Life. This decision led to Second Life being cultivated into a

accompanying text.
31. Screenshot No. 3 (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (showing the interface that can
allow landowners to ban specific Second Life users from their virtual property).
32. RYMASZEWSKI ET AL., supra note 21, at 4 (“Second Life is a 3D online digital world
imagined, created and owned by its residents. . . . [It] is a virtual environment in which almost all
of the content is created by users . . . . You are the one who determines what Second Life means
to you.”).
33. Screenshot No. 4 (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (showing an avatar using the
three-dimensional graphics-creation software).
34. See RYMASZEWSKI ET AL., supra note 21, at 144–77 (describing the creation process);
see also id. at 144–45 (picturing an airport); id. at 160 (leather chair); id. at 38 (water slide); id. at
156 (oranges, apples, and bananas); id. at 297 (sea plane); id. at 126–27 (stone split-level near a
lighthouse).
35. See id. at 166–68 (calling a wearable object an “attachment”). Users can create content
by using the graphic-creation interface to manipulate and link together basic building blocks
called “prims.” Id. at 146. Prims can be molded into various shapes, given different texture
qualities, or combined to form larger, more complex objects. See id. at 147–58 (providing
instructions). Through this sculpting, manipulation, and compilation of prims, users can create
sophisticated objects like waterfalls to populate the Second Life world. See BRIAN A. WHITE,
SECOND LIFE: A GUIDE TO YOUR VIRTUAL WORLD 120–68 (2008) (leading readers step-bystep through the building process); id. at 273–78 (instructing readers how to construct a
waterfall).
36. RYMASZEWSKI ET AL., supra note 21, at 316; see also Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc.,
487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 596 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (“[Linden Lab’s believes that its ownership] policy
recognizes . . . users are making significant contributions to building these worlds and should be
able to both own the content they create and share in the value that is created. The preservation
of users’ property rights is a necessary step toward the emergence of genuinely real online
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virtual market economy, populated by digital avatars buying and
37
selling virtual goods. This economy of virtual goods does not stop at
the edges of Second Life’s digital world, but instead continues
actively in a variety of internet portals ranging from a currency
38
exchange on Linden Lab’s website to online auctions run by eBay
39
where residents can acquire parcels of land.
A Second Life resident gains a number of different ownership
rights by acquiring virtual property. Some of these diverse ownership
rights include the right to exclude others from using the property, the
right to use the property, the right to destroy the property, the right
to manipulate or alter the property, the right to prevent others from
copying a unique or novel creation, and the right to put the property
into the stream of virtual commerce by selling or transferring these
rights to another resident. Exercising these entitlements can be done
in a variety of ways. For example, the right to exclude others from
property and the right to prevent copying of unique creations can be
enforced by Linden Lab through the unique identification number
Linden automatically generates for each item produced in Second
40
Life. This unique identification number enforces the exclusionary
right by allowing Linden Lab officials to track property back to its

worlds.” (quoting Press Release, Linden Lab, Linden Lab Preserves Real World Intellectual
Property Rights of Users of Its Second Life Online Services (Nov. 14, 2003) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal))).
37. Second Life has been described by its founder Philip Rosedale as being
a developing nation . . . . When we were developing the idea we read a lot of books
and were inspired by Hernando DeSoto’s The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism
Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else.
. . . The fundamental basis of a successful developing nation is property ownership. If
people cannot own property, the wheels of western capitalism can’t turn from the
bottom.
Aleks Krotoski, Second Life and the Virtual Property Boom, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED’S GAMES
BLOG, June 14, 2005, http://blogs.guardian.co.uk/games/archives/2005/06/14/second_life_and_
the_virtual_property_boom.html (quoting Philip Rosedale).
38. Residents of Second Life can trade U.S. dollars for Linden dollars on an exchange
hosted by Linden called LindeX. See Second Life Currency Exchange, https://secureweb20.secondlife.com/account/login.php?type=second-life-member&nextpage=/currency/index.
php (last visited Oct. 10, 2008). Linden dollars are the currency used by residents in Second Life.
Id.
39. Second Life, Land Auctions, http://usd.auctions.secondlife.com (last visited Oct. 10,
2008).
40. See RYMASZEWSKI ET AL., supra note 21, at 7 (“[A]ny of the data [acquiring a unique
ID] is guaranteed to be unique across space and time . . . .” (quoting Jeff Luan)).
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rightful owner to prevent thefts or unauthorized copying of a virtual
41
object.
Another important feature of Second Life is the basic rules
Linden Lab has set to govern residents’ behavior in general. The core
rules governing interaction between residents are contained in the
42
Community Standards. These rules are also commonly referred to as
43
the “Big Six.” Instead of creating clear bright-line rules that
residents must conform with precisely, these rules delineate what
conduct is prohibited by establishing general standards of how
44
residents should behave. The Big Six are enforced primarily by
45
residents making complaints to Linden Lab authorities. If residents
violate any of the Big Six rules, they run the risk of being suspended
from Second Life or even having their accounts terminated
46
permanently. But the efficacy of these enforcement measures is
uncertain, particularly the ability to terminate users’ accounts, which
results in the individual losing their virtual property. Part III explores
the effectiveness of these enforcement measures in more detail.
Finally, the combination of Second Life’s interactive culture and
the virtual world’s democratic code-based infrastructure, which allows
residents to define and implement rules determining their and other
47
residents’ behaviors, presents an interesting confluence of two types
of social norms regulating user behavior in the virtual world. The first
type of social norms, referred to as “non-code-based norms” for the
41. See id. (detailing how Linden Labs can use the identification number); see also id. at
165 (describing how an object’s creator can limit, through “asset permissions” in the Build
window interface, other residents’ use of that object).
42. Second Life, Community Standards, http://secondlife.com/corporate/cs.php (last viewed
Aug. 29, 2008).
43. CARR & POND, supra note 25, at 40–42. The Big Six prohibit the following conduct: (1)
“Intolerance”; (2) “Harassment”; (3) “Assault”; (4) “Disclosure [of another resident’s personal
information]”; (5) “Indecency”; and (6) “Disturbing the Peace.” Second Life, Community
Standards, supra note 42.
44. See Second Life, Community Standards, supra note 42. For example, “harassment” is
described as “[c]ommunicating or behaving in a manner which is offensively coarse, intimidating
or threatening, constitutes unwelcome sexual advances or requests for sexual favors, or is
otherwise likely to cause annoyance or alarm.” Id.
45. See Second Life, Online Harassment, http://secondlife.com/policy/security/harassment.
php (last visited Oct. 10, 2008) (instructing victims to file abuse reports for violations of Linden
Lab’s Community Standards).
46. CARR & POND, supra note 25, at 40.
47. “Democratic” in this instance refers to an approach of code creation, and in turn rule
creation, which is decentralized, open to all residents, and not exclusively in the hands of the
world’s operators or original creators. For a description of the types of user-created rules, see
infra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
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remainder of this Note, are norms that residents and the operators of
Second Life create and enforce. An example of a non-code-based
norm is the Big Six rules of behavior propagated by Linden Lab and
policed largely by residents. Another example of non-code-based
48
norms is the sanction of unfavorable gossiping.
The second type of social norm in Second Life is code-based
norms. Code-based norms can be created and employed by both
residents and Linden Lab to fulfill the virtual world’s important
objectives, but unlike non-code-based norms, these rules are enforced
through the very computer code of Second Life. As illustrated by the
49
theory of “Code is Law,” these norms enforce rules by defining what
conduct or behaviors are possible in the computer program’s virtual
world. An example of a code-based social norm is an object creator’s
ability to define who can use the virtual property by making it
impossible for those not entitled to use the property to put it into
their inventory—a cyber “purse” where residents can store items they
50
have collected. Another example of a code-based social norm is the
ability to define how an object will be used even after it has left the
51
creator’s control. Like the previous examples for non-code-based
norms, this list is not an exhaustive survey of all the code-based social
norms in Second Life. The residents’ ability to define through the
very code of Second Life’s program how their property is used,
transferred, manipulated, or destroyed even after it has left the
creator’s control presents a plethora of possible code-based social
norms that are commonly used to achieve the important objectives of
this virtual community.

48. Users can sanction violators with unfavorable gossip by reporting the violator’s illicit
behavior (usually conduct prohibited by the Big Six) on public weblogs and websites. See infra
Part III.
49. See supra notes 3–6 and accompanying text.
50. See RYMASZEWSKI ET AL., supra note 21, at 165 (discussing asset permissions); see also
id. at 128 (showing a screenshot of an aviatar’s inventory and explaining how an inventory
functions in Second Life).
51. See generally WHITE, supra note 35, at 229–51 (describing some thirty ways in which
scripting language, a more sophisticated component of the object-creation system, allows users
to manipulate their creations’ qualities). For instance, a script can be placed on a house to make
it impossible for certain residents selected by the owner to enter the home. See id. at 230, 245–46
(describing a mechanism for locking one’s virtual door).
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL NORMS IN
A SMALL COMMUNITY
To better understand how norms developed in Second Life and
whether those norms are efficient in maximizing residents’ welfare,
this Part compares studies of social norms in other communities. This
comparison focuses on the objectives and other factors that gave rise
to effective social norms in these other communities. This comparison
reveals that social norms have thrived in communities in which
effective monitoring and sanctions for offending behavior are
possible, adherence to and knowledge of the existing social norms are
pervasive, and reciprocity between the community’s members is
common. In addition, the comparison focuses on which conditions
prevent social norms from maximizing participants’ welfare.
Although the communities in this comparison are smaller and quite
different in composition from the virtual world of Second Life, the
common themes of these communities are illustrative in evaluating
the potential success or failure of code-based and non-code-based
social norms in Second Life.
A. Development of Norms in Other Small Communities
Like many fisheries across the world, the lobster beds off the
coast of Maine are a finite resource. But unlike many fisheries, the
Maine lobster beds are closely guarded and monitored by effective
social norms that have emerged from the close-knit community. One
of the most important social norms to emerge in this community was
the establishment of territories over which small groups of
52
lobstermen could claim ownership. This particular social norm
emerged, at least in part, to address the important objective of
53
preserving the lobster population levels in Maine’s coastal waters.
Although the gangs’ territories are not recognized by any regulatory

52. See ACHESON, supra note 15, at 3 (“The most distinctive feature of lobstering clusters
or harbor gangs is that they claim and defend fishing areas. Territoriality does not exist in any
other Maine fishery.”). The lobstermen of Maine are mostly divided into smaller groups often
referred to as harbor gangs. Id. at 48. These smaller groups possess tracts of water off the coast
in which they have the right to set traps for lobsters. See id. at 48–49 (describing the gangs’
system of communal ownership). Through the social norms established by the larger
community, gang members may destroy other gangs’ traps placed within the first gang’s
territory. Id. at 48–49.
53. See id. at 55–56 (“[B]iologists are convinced that a fixed number of legal-sized lobsters
inhabit any given area. If one man takes them, another cannot.”); id. at 154–57 (laying out the
economic and biological benefits of the gangs’ trap-limiting policies).
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body outside the small lobstermen communities, these norms are
effective in regulating the lobstermen’s interactions and, more
importantly, their exploitation of the open resource of the lobster
54
beds. Partially privatizing the open resource is also advantageous
because it forces the gangs to internalize the costs of owning their
55
tracts.
Effective monitoring and enforcement of the norms are two of
the factors contributing to the success of these social norms when
56
they operate outside the bounds of official regulation. If conditions
had made effective monitoring impossible, or if the repercussions for
violating the social norms were inadequate, then the norms would
likely have been ineffective in regulating community participants’
behavior.
Similar to the emergence of social norms in the lobstermen
communities, social norms emerged among early American whalers
to address the varying needs of their resources’ particular
characteristics. Depending on the type of whale, the needs of the
57
whalers were fundamentally different. Early American whalers
58
primarily hunted two types of whales: the sperm whale, which is an
aggressive, quick-moving creature that can be difficult and even
59
dangerous to catch; and the right whale, which by contrast is a slow
60
and docile creature that is significantly easier to kill. Unlike the
sperm whale, however, the right whale can sink after it is killed, thus
making it difficult for the whalers who killed the beast to claim its
61
carcass. The different characteristics of these two resources
generated different norms determining when and how a whaler could
54. See id. at 49, 154–57 (describing the self-imposed regulations’ efficacy).
55. See Demsetz, supra note 13, at 350 (“[T]he main allocative function of property rights is
the internalization of beneficial and harmful effects . . . .”).
56. See ACHESON, supra note 15, at 73–77 (examining how the lobstermen police their
territory).
57. See Ellickson, supra note 9, at 89–94 (describing whaling property norms as the wealthmaximizing outgrowth of different whale species’ attributes).
58. See id. at 91 (discussing the different norms for sperm and right whales).
59. See id. (“[S]perm whales swim faster, dive deeper, and fight more viciously than right
whales . . . . The vigor of the sperm whale . . . increased the chance that a line would not hold or
would have to be cut to save the boat.”). If the sperm whale were able to break free from the
lines and escape the hunt, it could still die later to be harvested by whalers who did not exert
any effort or undertake any risk to capture the creature. See id. at 92 (describing the emergence
of the “iron-holds-the-whale” rule).
60. See id. at 89 (“Because right whales are relatively slow and docile, a whale on a line was
not likely to capsize the harpooning boat, break the line, or [otherwise escape] . . . .”).
61. Id. at 89–90.
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establish a property claim over a slain or wounded whale because a
single property norm would not have successfully accounted for both
62
sperm and right whales’ respective traits. For example, a rule that
allocated property rights to whoever first marked the whale with a
“waif,” or unique harpoon, was effective for sperm, but not right,
63
whales. The waif system suited sperm whales because they travel in
schools, rewarding “boatsmen [who could] kill or mortally wound as
many animals as quickly as possible” without forcing them to “paus[e]
64
to secure the stricken whales to the mother ship.” But the waif
system would have provided the wrong incentives for hunting docile,
solitary right whales; instead, granting rights to whoever could keep
the whale tethered to their ship “reward[ed] the first harpooner, who
had performed the hardest part of the hunt, as opposed to free riders
65
waiting in the wings.”
These norms were successful in regulating the behavior of the
whalers because the social norms incorporated the community’s
important objective of allocating the ownership of the whale in such a
66
way to maximize the community’s wealth. Additionally, the norms
were successful because they were adopted and respected by the
67
members of the whaler communities. If these norms had not been
followed by members of the community, or had there been a large
influx of outsiders who disregarded the social rules, these norms
would have been ineffective in regulating the participants’ behavior in
68
this small community.
Finally, to at least partially avoid the high transaction costs
associated with resorting to the legal system for rule enforcement, a
small community of ranchers in a rural region of northern California,
Shasta County, developed a set of social norms to regulate the
69
behavior of the community’s members. For example, the social norm
62. See id. at 88–92 (differentiating the “fast-fish, loose-fish” rule for right whales from the
“iron-holds-the-whale” rule for sperm whales).
63. See id. at 91–92 (describing the “waif-holds-a-whale” practice).
64. Id. at 91.
65. Id. at 89–90.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 94 (“Whalers had little use for law or litigation. . . . [F]or more than a
century[,] American whalers [were] able to resolve their disputes without any reassurance from
American courts.” ).
68. See id. at 94–95 n.39 (describing the norms’ breakdown as the whaling community
became “less close-knit” and “whalers’ informal system of social control began to unravel”).
69. See ELLICKSON, supra note 10, at 52, 61 (describing the residents’ practices and
attitudes).
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of “neighborliness” was developed in this small community to protect
70
the community members from the trespass of other members’ cattle.
The social norm of neighborliness operates by creating the
expectation that it is not morally justified to either reap a benefit or
cause harm to another person without first providing fair
71
compensation. Thus, a rancher whose cattle wanders into a
neighboring ranch causing damage to the neighbor’s property would
be compelled under the guidance of the social norm of neighborliness
to provide fair compensation for the damaged property, even though
the rancher may not be required to do so under state law because
72
both tracts of land are in an “open range.” This loosely defined
social norm of neighborliness is effective in regulating the community
members’ behavior because this form of social control is enforced
73
through effective self-help sanctions like negative gossiping.
Negative gossiping is an effective sanction because the community’s
participants highly value their reputations and their reputations can
be marred by negative social gossip spreading through the tight-knit
74
community. If either the members of the community did not value
their reputations, or there was no reciprocity between the neighbors,
the sanction of negative gossip would be an ineffective means of
enforcing the social norm. Additionally, like the norms that
developed in the community of lobstermen and whalers, the social
norms that developed among these ranchers were successful because
they incorporated the community’s important objective of avoiding
the high transaction costs that can arise when disputes resort to legal
resolution.
The efficacy of social norms in these three communities required
not only the incorporation of the communities’ important objectives
into the structure of the norms, but also the presence of a number of
other factors. Some of the factors necessary for social norms to
function efficiently include effective monitoring and sanctions for
70. Id. at 53.
71. See id. (“Cattlemen typically couch their justifications for the norm in moral
terms. . . . Dick Coombs: It ‘isn’t right’ to get free pasturage at the expense of one’s
neighbors. . . . Attorney-rancher Pete Schulz: A cattleman is ‘morally obligated to fence’ to
protect his neighbor’s crops, even in open range.”).
72. See id. at 56 (describing one such incident).
73. See id. at 58 (illustrating how “truthful negative gossip” effectively sanctions
nonneighborly behavior without resort to any legal authority).
74. See id. at 57 (describing the ranchers of Shasta as a close-knit group of neighbors who
strongly “value their reputations in the community” because they plan to reside in Shasta
indefinitely).
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75

offending behavior, adherence to and knowledge of the existing
76
77
social norms, and reciprocity between the community’s members.
No one of these factors is likely dispositive in determining the success
or failure of a social norm; taken together, however, these factors can
determine whether a set of norms will efficiently regulate a
participant’s behavior within a community.
B. The Development of Social Norms in Second Life
Like social norms in other communities, social norms in Second
Life developed largely in response to the virtual world’s important
objectives. Some of the important objectives in Second Life include
the objectives of “creator empowerment,” “respect,” and
“entrepreneurship.”
One of Second Life’s important objectives is to provide users the
ability to maintain ownership rights over their virtual land and
78
property. To perpetuate this objective of “creator empowerment,”
the virtual world of Second Life has developed a set of social norms
enabling owners of virtual property to define how their property is
used. These norms are exercised both through the very code of the
Second Life program and through the rules propagated by Second
Life residents. For example, code-based social norms, like the ability
to exclude others from using a virtual object through Second Life’s
scripting language, can define and protect an individual’s ownership
79
over virtual property. Similarly, non-code-based social norms such as
owner-created rules protect ownership rights by defining how visitors
80
to an owner’s Sim should behave. Unlike code-based norms
regulating visitor behavior, non-code-based norms require monitoring
by the virtual land’s owner and other visitors. If offending behavior is
discovered, the landowner can enforce social norms preserving the
75. See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 69–74 and accompanying text.
78. See supra Part I.
79. See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text.
80. The Sim titled “The Sand Box on Heron Island” delivers rules to visitors the moment
they enter the Sim in two ways: Rules are sent first via a message to the resident, delivered as a
downloadable note. The rules of the Sim are also made available via giant signs near the
entrance of the Sim. The sign in this particular Sim is user friendly, complete with a computer
code function allowing the resident to change the language of the sign if the user does not read
English. Screenshot No. 5 (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (showing the downloaded note
transmitted automatically to the Sim’s visitors and the billboard that welcomes the visitors when
they arrive).
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creator empowerment objective by either removing the offender from
the Sim using a code-based tool or reporting the offender to Linden
81
authorities for further sanctions.
Another important objective of Second Life is to ensure that the
82
interaction between the world’s residents is respectful. This
objective prompted the development of norms fulfilling the objective
of user “respect.” One of these norms in Second Life is the Big Six
83
rules created by Linden Lab. Code-based norms like the automated
controls set by Sim owners can also regulate the behavior of visitors
to a Sim and thus also serve to fulfill the objective of ensuring
respectful interactions between Second Life residents. For example,
Sim owners can designate their Sims, through the user interface
controlling the properties of their Sims, a “safe zone” where it is
84
impossible to bring any object classified as a weapon. This codebased norm is often employed to keep “griefers,” Second Life
85
residents who intend to harass and annoy other residents, from
creating a nuisance in a Sim.
Furthermore, the objective of “entrepreneurship” developed in
Second Life in response to Linden Lab’s desire to build a virtual
world where the users would populate the alternate reality with user86
created content. To perpetuate the entrepreneurship objective,
multiple social norms in Second Life emerged. These norms serve the
entrepreneurship objective by creating incentives, primarily the
incentive of earning a profit—both in the form of real-world currency
and the virtual currency of Second Life—to create objects that will
populate the virtual world. The entrepreneurship objective has
largely been realized by several non-code-based norms that were
established by Linden Lab in response to the growing requests of
many Second Life residents. In particular, Linden Lab decided to
adopt a “laissez-faire policy on buying and selling the official in-world
81. Second Life, Online Harassment, supra note 45.
82. See Second Life, Community Standards, supra note 42 (requiring users, through Second
Life’s Community Standards, to treat each other with “respect and without harassment”).
83. See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text (describing the broad standards of
conduct with which the Big Six rules require residents to comply and how the rules are often
enforced by residents lodging complaints of violations).
84. See CARR & POND, supra note 25, at 211–12 (describing how it would be impossible to
bring a weapon into a “safe zone” because the code of Second Life will automatically remove
any person who attempts to enter a safe zone with a weapon).
85. WHITE, supra note 35, at 358 (“A griefer is an individual whose enjoyment of [Second
Life] is enhanced by negatively affecting the experience of other [Second Life] residents.”).
86. See supra Part I.
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currency” on open markets like Amazon or eBay for real-world
87
money. Additionally, Linden Lab followed the suggestions of
Professor Lessig and began to formally recognize Second Life
residents’ intellectual property rights over the objects they created
88
within the virtual world. These two policies, inspired by Second Life
residents, were the nucleus of the virtual economy’s boom because
these norms established the foundations of a viable market economy
by creating real incentives for individuals to invest time and effort in
89
creating virtual goods.
Although these three important objectives and their
corresponding norms cover a wide range of interactions in Second
Life, they are by no means an exhaustive list of the objectives and
norms that have developed in the virtual world. This limited sample,
however, serves as a useful starting point for determining whether the
necessary conditions are present for social norms to effectively
regulate the cyber-reality of Second Life.
III. CONDITIONS FACILITATING AND IMPEDING THE
EFFICACY OF SOCIAL NORMS IN SECOND LIFE
Studies of social norms in other communities indicate that
several conditions may be required for social norms to successfully
90
maximize the welfare of Second Life participants. Some of the
conditions include effective monitoring and adequate sanctions for
behavior that violates the norms, adherence to and respect for the
established norms, and reciprocity between the participants in the
91
community. Despite the existence of some conditions facilitating the
development of social norms in Second Life, the pervasive presence

87. RYMASZEWSKI ET AL., supra note 21, at 316. This laissez-faire policy is different than
the stance taken by many other online virtual worlds that forbid the exchange of virtual
currency for real-world currency. See, e.g., World of Warcraft, Terms of Use Agreement,
http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/legal/termsofuse.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2008) (“Blizzard
does not recognize any virtual property transfers executed outside of the Game or the
purported sale, gift or trade in the ‘real world’ of anything related to the Game. Accordingly,
you may not sell items for ‘real’ money or otherwise exchange items for value outside of the
Game.”).
88. RYMASZEWSKI ET AL., supra note 21, at 316.
89. See id. (describing how the growth of a “substantial mercantile class” of artisans,
entertainers, builders, and designers was the byproduct of Linden Lab’s decisions to allow
residents to retain ownership of virtual goods and to allow the free exchange of virtual Linden
dollars for real-world currency).
90. See supra Part II.A.
91. See supra Part II.A.

STOUP.DOC

328

10/31/2008 1:21:24 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:311

of conditions impeding the development of social norms such as the
inadequate sanctions implemented by Linden Lab, ineffective
policing for offensive conduct, marginal adherence to the social
norms resulting from an influx of uneducated outsiders, and a lack of
reciprocity stemming from the anonymous format of the network,
have likely stymied the efficacy of social norms in maximizing the
welfare of the virtual world’s residents.
A. Monitoring and Sanctions
Similar to the monitoring scheme enacted by the Maine
92
lobstermen, much of the monitoring for offending behavior in
Second Life is conducted by the participants in the community. For
instance, when a resident contravenes one of the standards set out in
the Big Six, any resident who witnessed this breach of conduct can file
a report with Linden Lab and start a process that could end in a
93
sanctioning of the alleged illicit behavior. Additionally, groups of
concerned residents have also come together to form groups that
police the Sims of Second Life, looking for any residents who are
acting in contravention of the norms of respect. One of the most
94
famous vigilante groups is the Second Life Alliance. Unlike the
above example of individuals acting independently, members of the
Second Life Alliance dealt directly with the offensive behavior by
95
punishing it in turn with their own form of griefing.
Unlike the relatively small community of Maine lobstermen, the
world of Second Life is massive with over fifteen million registered
96
97
users, thousands of groups, and more than twenty million dollars
98
spent in the virtual world every month. Because of the massive scope
and scale of interactions between Second Life residents, it is very
difficult for Linden Lab authorities to effectively monitor the entire

92. See supra notes 52–56.
93. Second Life, Online Harassment, supra note 45.
94. CARR & POND, supra note 25, at 66.
95. See id. (describing how the Alliance built massive ships around the afflicted areas, and
how they used these ships to compel behavior the Alliance deemed acceptable).
96. Second Life, Economic Statistics, http://secondlife.com/whatis/economy_stats.php (last
visited Oct. 10, 2008).
97. CARR & POND, supra note 25, at 50.
98. See Second Life, Economic Statistics: Graphs, http://secondlife.com/whatis/economygraphs.php (last visited Oct. 10, 2008) (indicating the historic amount of U.S. dollars spent per
month in Second Life).

STOUP.DOC

2008]

10/31/2008 1:21:24 PM

SOCIAL NORMS IN SECOND LIFE

329

99

grid. This inability to police the entire grid could prompt users to file
tort claims of negligence against the operators of the virtual worlds
100
for failing to ensure the safety of the network. Therefore, the
exponential success and growth of Second Life may have generated
the condition of ineffective monitoring which will in turn impede the
proper development of efficient social norms.
Despite the inherent difficulties of monitoring a massive
community of individuals, Second Life has improved on the group
monitoring schemes used by the Maine lobstermen by employing
some automated monitoring controls to alert Linden officials of
offending behavior. For instance, when a resident tries to bring a
weapon into a Sim that is designated a safe zone and is booted off
that Sim for the offending conduct, Linden Lab is eventually alerted
to the individual’s trespass on the norm of respecting the Sim owners’
101
intent to keep their Sim a safe environment. Even more automated
monitoring controls have been developed by Second Life residents
through the adaptable scripting-language feature. For example,
scripted language can be added to virtual objects making it impossible
102
for other users to place the object in their inventory. Thus the object
itself incorporates antiburglary measures that are in some ways more
103
powerful than real-world burglary protections.
Automated
monitoring controls, like the two above examples, are likely the most
efficient and effective means to monitor illicit conduct because these
controls can be accomplished with little cost once the code is
104
created. Although this automatic control seems to be the most

99. CARR & POND, supra note 25, at 66–67 (relaying how many residents have complained
that it takes Linden officials a long time to respond to complaints, sometimes up to an hour, and
how many complaints remain unresolved without an investigation or sanction).
100. Benjamin Duranske, Virtually Blind’s Predictions for Virtual Law in 2008, VIRTUALLY
BLIND, Jan. 1, 2008, http://virtuallyblind.com/2008/01/01/2008-virtual-law-predictions.
101. See CARR & POND, supra note 25, at 211–12 (noting that Linden Lab will suspend a
resident who repeatedly tries to bring a weapon into a Sim designated as a safe zone).
102. See Screenshot No. 6 (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (showing an avatar not being
able to pick-up an object because the “take” command which would normally allow the avatar
to do so is grayed out and unavailable).
103. For example, a car alarm in real life will only deter burglars from stealing a car. Script
language in Second Life can change the very qualities of a virtual object, making it impossible
for a potential thief to pick up the object. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. Thus, the
protections in Second Life, which actually determine what is possible, are more powerful
defenses than the simple deterrents of real-world protections.
104. The costs of maintaining the code-based automatic monitors are likely to be less than
the costs of employing Linden Lab employees, or other residents, to patrol the cyber-streets of
Second Life. Automated code monitors will likely cost less because a single piece of code can
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efficient system of alerting Linden officials to illicit conduct,
automatic monitors cover few of the behaviors outlawed in Second
Life and are thus an inadequate solution to the problem of
monitoring the massive world.
Although there is some evidence of successful monitoring
schemes in Second Life, the virtual world has long struggled to
implement effective sanctions that deter offensive behavior and
enforce established norms. An example of an early sanction’s failure
to effectively enforce norms was the use of the “cornfield purgatory”
105
to punish residents. The cornfield purgatory sanction entailed
banishing a resident who violated one of the rules of Second Life to a
Sim where all the resident could do was ride a tractor in a field of
106
corn. This sanction was ultimately an ineffective deterrent because
many residents wanted to see the cornfield purgatory and started to
purposefully violate Second Life’s rules to experience the tractor
107
ride.
Amusing anecdotes aside, the failure to employ effective
sanctions has continued in Second Life. For example, one of the most
common sanctions employed in Second Life is the punishment of
108
negative gossiping. Gossiping as a sanction has been used to
publicly shame residents who have employed automated programs
109
which frustrate the objective of
known as “landbots,”
entrepreneurship in Second Life. One weblog in particular compiles a
list of all known landbots and their possible operators so that
residents who have their land sold unbeknownst to them by a landbot
110
can contact the landbot’s operator and request a refund. Though
alerting other residents to the illicit behavior of some may serve a

apply to all objects in Second Life and would require little involvement from Linden Lab
employees once implemented, whereas personal monitoring would require many Linden Lab
employees or Second Life Residents.
105. CARR & POND, supra note 25, at 43.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Second Life, Community: Incident Report, http://secondlife.com/support/
incidentreport.php (last visited Oct. 10, 2008) (listing the offenses reported to the Second Life
Governance Team, and the eventual sanctions given to the offenders).
109. Landbot Invasion, Landbot FAQ, http://landbot.wordpress.com/landbot-faq (last
visited Oct. 10, 2008) (defining “landbots” as automated computer programs that search
through listings of Second Life land for sale and purchase the land cheaply even when the owner
may not intend to sell the land for that price).
110. Landbot Invasion, Landbot Directory, http://landbot.wordpress.com/directory (last
visited Oct. 10, 2008).
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useful purpose, gossiping is likely an ineffective deterrent if the
offenders do not care about their reputations or if the offenders can
easily change their identities. Because residents in Second Life can
111
easily change their identities, the sanction of gossiping is likely not
an effective sanction. Furthermore, unlike the residents of Shasta
County who closely guarded their reputations, many residents in
Second Life are indifferent to other residents’ perceptions of them
and are thus unaffected by negative gossip. For example, a Second
Life resident named Lazarus Devine angered many other users by
erecting garish virtual signs calling for an end to the war in Iraq and
to “Impeach Bush” on property he purchased adjacent to the
112
disgruntled users. The disgruntled users tried to stop the sign
propagation by engaging in negative gossip and a heated campaign of
sending the offending resident an endless stream of “instant
113
messages” complaining about his actions. Despite the best efforts of
the disgruntled users, Lazarus Devine continued his campaign to
114
erect garish signs.
Even Second Life’s harshest sanction, the threat of account
termination, which is prescribed as a possible punishment in the
115
virtual world’s Term of Service, is also likely an ineffective sanction.
Because the potential property loss from an account termination is
116
great, it is uncertain whether Linden Lab has the authority to
terminate a user’s account without providing compensation for the
lost virtual property. This uncertainty became evident in a 2007
preliminary ruling in a federal case concerning a dispute between
117
Linden Lab and a disgruntled former user. In the ruling, the federal
111. See infra note 139.
112. Steven Johnson, Brave New World, DISCOVER, Mar. 4, 2006, http://discovermagazine.
com/2006/apr/well-intro.
113. See id. (explaining how the angered residents engaged in negative gossip by erecting
their own signs which said “Impeach Lazarus Devine”).
114. Id.
115. Second Life, Terms of Service, http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php (last visited Oct.
10, 2008).
116. The Second Life Terms of Service indicates that a user will not receive compensation
for a terminated or suspended account:
In the event that Linden Lab suspends or terminates your Account or this
Agreement, you understand and agree that you shall receive no refund or exchange
for any unused time on a subscription, any license or subscription fees, any content or
data associated with your Account, or for anything else.
Id.
117. See Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 595 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (“Plaintiff,
March Bragg, Esq., claims an ownership interest in such virtual property. Bragg contends that
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judge hinted that although the property in dispute was “virtual,” the
ownership entitlements to the virtual property may be real and thus
118
the plaintiff’s seizure claims could be valid. As a result, Linden Lab
may no longer be able to utilize the sanction of account termination
without first providing compensation for the user’s lost virtual
property.
B. Adherence to Social Norms
As another condition necessary to facilitate the efficacy of social
norms in Second Life, residents must adhere to the social norms of
the virtual world. Because Second Life as a world and a community is
119
so expansive and diverse, it is difficult to gauge the level of
adherence with any amount of precision. Despite this reality, an
analysis of the general types of communities in Second Life can be
useful in determining the level of adherence to social norms.
Generally, there are two types of communities in Second Life: those
that congregate on a Sim they control, and those that have no Sim
control. The first group can implement social norms and enforce
adherence with real success. Communities with virtual land can
enforce norms and create adherence because ownership of land
empowers an individual to enact several measures that can aid in
120
increasing the rate of adherence to social norms. The first of these
measures is notification and publication of the norms. Owners of
Second Life land can enable an automatic function, to inform the
visitor of the virtual property’s rules once the visitors enter the virtual
121
land. Because nonlandowners do not have access to this feature, it is
harder for nonlandowners to inform residents of the governing social
norms, and will correspondingly impact the rate of adherence.
Nonlandowners have some tools at their service to inform other
residents of norms. These tools include objects with script language
that will communicate the social norms to any residents in proximity
122
to the automated virtual object, manual distribution of note cards
Defendants, the operators of [Second Life], unlawfully confiscated his virtual property and
denied him access to their virtual world.”).
118. Id.
119. Ondrejka, supra note 17, at 30 (detailing that more than 70 percent of Second Life’s
users reside outside of the United States).
120. See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
122. See RYMASZEWSKI ET AL., supra note 21, at 195 (displaying scripting language that can
be added to a virtual object to make that object “chat” with any residents in proximity).
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detailing the norms, and dissemination of the rules through online
123
websites outside of Second Life. Although these measures will
spread details of the social norms, they are likely neither as effective
nor as efficient as the automated controls because the automated
controls will inform every visiting resident whereas the nonlandholder
measures will likely miss some residents because they have a more
limited reach.
The second measure land-controlling groups have at their
disposal are the automatic controls to police and enforce established
social norms. Virtual landowners have the ability to enable
automated, code-based controls that can monitor certain behaviors
and either alert the virtual property owner to that offensive behavior
124
or automatically boot the offender from the virtual land.
Nonlandholding groups, however, must rely on group policing and
the limited presence of Linden authorities to ensure that their norms
125
are upheld.
Similar to the inefficiencies inherent to the
nonautomated means of distributing the details of governing norms,
nonautomated enforcement measures are more likely to fail to catch
offending behavior than are automated controls. Additionally, the
automated controls are more likely a less expensive method than
employing individuals to watch for behavior violating relevant social
norms. For these reasons, the level of adherence to social norms in
Second Life largely depends on the availability of tools to
automatically inform residents of the norms and enforce them.
Therefore, although it is impossible to determine the universal level
of adherence in Second Life, the applicable level can be determined
on a smaller scale by looking to see which communities have access to
these tools, and which do not.
Additionally, other factors like the influx of outsiders who
disregard the established norms can have a deleterious effect on the
126
level of adherence in a community. Because Second Life is an open
127
network expanding rapidly, a deluge of outsiders disregarding the

123. See Second Life, Community Standards, supra note 42 (listing the Big Six rules).
124. For a description of how one control was designed to automatically boot residents who
attempted to bring guns into Sims designated as safe zones, see supra note 101 and
accompanying text.
125. For a description of the difficulty associated with policing the entire grid, see supra note
99 and accompanying text.
126. ELLICKSON, supra note 10, at 94.
127. Compare Second Life, Economic Statistics, supra note 96 (indicating that Second Life
has more than fifteen million registered users), with Ondrejka, supra note 17, at 30 (explaining
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social norms is likely an ever-present problem in the virtual world.
The influx of disruptive outsiders that motivated a group of Second
Life citizens to form vigilante groups similar to the Second Life
128
Alliance is one of the more infamous examples of this problem. In
the early days of Second Life, a large group of users from a
competitive and battle-oriented virtual world joined Second Life and
129
began to harass and attack the once peaceful residents. This influx
of outsiders with different cultural norms threatened the peaceful and
cooperative culture of Second Life. But two coinciding occurrences
greatly diminished the threat posed by these disruptive outsiders:
concerned citizens began to retaliate against the disruptive outsiders
by building defensive fortifications to keep the militant faction out of
the peaceful areas of Second Life, and Second Life’s grid expanded so
much that Second Life users who wanted to fight had new territories
130
all to their own. The threat of outsiders undermining community
norms can also be limited by organizing groups with exclusive
membership and by limiting other residents’ access to any Sims a
131
resident controls. Despite these salves, the flood of new residents
joining the world of Second Life on a daily basis has created a reality
in which outsiders will continually challenge the established norms.
Finally, limited evidence of well-developed relationships
between Second Life users suggests some of the conditions which
made the social norms in the Shasta County rancher community
successful may be present in Second Life. One of the conditions
which made social norms successful in Shasta County was the close
132
relationships that existed between the community members. Even
though the world of Second Life is immense and highly
133
heterogeneous, the virtual world’s residents are continually brought
together by the desire to create micro-communities where residents
134
can share their interests with other like-minded individuals. These
that Second Life had only seven million registered users in the second quarter of 2007).
128. RYMASZEWSKI ET AL., supra note 21, at 314–15 (describing the war of the Jessie Wall).
129. Id. at 314.
130. Id. at 315.
131. See Second Life, Online Harassment, supra note 45 (describing how owners of land can
determine, via code-based controls governing the settings of their property, which residents of
Second Life can enter their Sim).
132. ELLICKSON, supra note 10, at 56–64 (noting that Shasta residents prefer self-help
tactics).
133. See Ondrejka, supra note 17, at 30 (noting the large size of Second Life and that the
majority of users reside outside of the United States).
134. CARR & POND, supra note 25, at 50–51 (describing some of the many thousands of
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groups often lead to multiple interactions between Second Life
residents. For instance, the Second Life Bar Association has regular
meetings in which residents come together and discuss their opinions
135
about the emerging legal issues in Second Life. These meetings give
individuals the chance to share opinions, knowledge, and life
experiences with each other, thus providing the opportunity to form
close relationships.
Even though Second Life community members can form close
relationships in the virtual world, there is little evidence that the
virtual environment provides residents the chance to form multilevel
relationships like those formed in the small Shasta cowboy
136
community. A multilevel relationship is a relationship in which
137
individuals share connections extending beyond a single association.
An example of a multilevel relationship in Shasta County would be
the relationship that two farmers have as neighbors, compounded by
their relationship as members of the local Cattleman’s Association,
compounded by their relationship as distant cousins because the
Shasta community is so small and insular. In contrast, Second Life
residents generally only share one relationship, their virtual
138
relationship.
Additionally, similar to the situation in the Shasta County
community, some argue there is evidence of good reciprocity amongst
Second Life residents. Although anonymity is inherently present in
Second Life’s utilization of avatars and fictitious names to represent
residents in the virtual world, and despite the fact that fraud is ever
present because residents can create multiple accounts for $9.95 a
139
month, there is some evidence that the avatar system actually
groups on Second Life in which people with interests ranging from knitting to automobiles can
come together to share their passions).
135. Second Life Bar Association, SLBA Meetings, http://slba.info/meetings.html?current
=three (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
136. See generally ELLICKSON, supra note 10 (detailing how neighbors in Shasta County had
relationships with others in a number of capacities and how these deep relationships assisted in
the enforcement of norms).
137. See id. (same).
138. Although this observation seems to be generally true, there is some evidence that
Second Life residents attempt to form more complex relationships by establishing real-world
relationships along with their virtual relationships. See RYMASZEWSKI ET AL., supra note 21, at
320 (describing a couple who met on Second Life, became romantically involved in the real
world, and formed a Second Life business as partners).
139. Id. at 17. The ability to create multiple accounts can facilitate fraud because victims
would be unable to identify and avoid the residents who committed the fraudulent act. For
example, someone could be scammed by a user represented by a tall female avatar, only to
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creates better reciprocity than the blind interactions that dominate
most other transactions on the internet. For instance, at least one
study has posited that the use of avatars may actually create more
trust between users and thus promote more frequent and repeated
exchanges between users than would occur in other internet spaces
140
that do not have the avatar interface. Assuming this is true, it is still
unclear whether having avatars on Second Life is more likely to
exceed, or at the very least match, the level of reciprocity that exists
in small real-world communities with repeated face-to-face
interactions. Therefore, it is difficult to determine whether similar
levels of reciprocity between residents exist in Second Life as it
existed between the ranchers in Shasta County.
Despite evidence of conditions facilitating the successful
development of social norms such as the effective automated
monitoring tools and close relationships that can form between
residents, it is likely that the pervasive impeding conditions in Second
Life undermine these facilitating factors. Impeding conditions ranging
from the inherent challenges of monitoring a community populated
by millions of users to the unavailability of effective sanctions to
enforce social norms and the failure to form multilevel relationships
all likely have created an environment in which social norms alone
are inefficient in maximizing the participants’ welfare.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REGULATING SECOND LIFE
The shortcomings of social norms in efficiently regulating Second
Life can be rectified by expanding the use of regulatory schemes
employed both by Linden Lab and by real-world governments.
Linden Lab already has at its disposal a tool that can rapidly improve
the conditions in Second Life so that user-created social norms can
thrive. This tool is the code-based automated monitoring and sanction
mechanisms focused in 2008 on a limited set of behaviors in Second
Life. By extending these automated controls to cover a wider set of
illicit behaviors, such as using two different accounts to perpetrate a
fraud against another resident, Linden Labs could improve the
reciprocity between individuals and in turn improve a set of social
norms like the norms trying to fulfill the objective of respect.

unwittingly be scammed again by the same user, this time represented by a short, fat male as an
avatar.
140. Ondrejka, supra note 17, at 40.
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One potential automated control inspired by the norm of respect
could be a feature that allows a resident to “tag” a Second Life user
so that the resident will be informed when the tagged user is on the
same Sim, or if the offensive behavior warranting the tag was
sufficiently severe, Linden Lab could create a virtual restraining order
that would cause the offending user to be booted from the grid
whenever the user approached the original victim. Residents could
use this potential feature to avoid unwanted confrontation with
undesirables, thus improving the Second Life experience. Although
this salve could improve the Second Life experience, the feature
141
could be abused by the very griefers it seeks to limit. To minimize
any abuse, Linden Labs could require Second Life users utilizing the
tag feature to complete a brief application describing the harm they
are trying to limit. This additional step would help curb any potential
abuse by griefers by ensuring only legitimate complaints warrant a
punitive virtual restraining order.
Beyond automated controls, Linden Lab could institute noncode-based reforms to improve the efficacy of social norms in the
virtual world. For instance, Linden Lab could clear up the uncertainty
surrounding the enforceability of Second Life’s harshest and likely
most effective sanction, account termination, by devising a clearer
and more comprehensive set of rules for punishing residents. Instead
of only prescribing the severe punishment of “immediate and
permanent suspension or cancellation of your Account” for any
142
transgression of the broadly defined Big Six rules, Linden Lab
should create a more comprehensive penal code. This code could
clearly outline the specific punishment for a particular behavior. For
instance, although shoving or shooting an individual in a safe area
143
may be undesirable behavior, it seems irrational to terminate a
user’s account, which is a potential punishment under the Terms of
144
145
Service,
solely for this marginal transgression.
A more
proportional punishment may be temporary account suspension. On

141. Griefers could abuse a tag feature by using it on innocent Second Life residents.
142. See Second Life, Terms of Service, supra note 115 (illustrating that Second Life relies
more on broadly defined standards than on explicit rules for conduct because what behavior is
considered offensive is defined broadly).
143. See Second Life, Community Standards, supra note 42 (indicating that shooting or
shoving an individual may constitute an “assault”).
144. Second Life, Terms of Service, supra note 115.
145. See CARR & POND, supra note 25, at 210 (describing how a resident cannot be
permanently killed by any violence in Second Life).
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the other hand, the penal code could prescribe the harsh punishment
of account termination and even a report to the real-world authorities
for such illicit conduct as the dissemination of pornographic material
in a Sim designated for teens.
Although Linden Lab has indicated its ability to dole out lesser
146
punishment, the opacity of which punishment will be prescribed to
the offensive conduct can make Linden’s response to certain
misconduct seem irrational. Not having a clearly outlined penal code
could make punishment to an outsider uninformed of the world’s
objectives and norms seem irrational. For instance, an uninformed
outsider may find terminating the account of a user who uploaded
spyware into the virtual world to be harsh and irrational when
compared to the lack of action taken against users who fornicate in
147
public. It is important that Linden Lab’s response appear rational—
level of punishment corresponds to the necessary protection required
to deter societal harms—because a real-world court would be more
inclined to enforce the rules erected by Linden Lab if the court
148
determines the rules were instituted for rational reasons.
To ensure that regulations created by Linden Lab will
simultaneously fulfill the objectives of the site and maximize the
residents’ welfare, the democratically inspired social norms of the
virtual world should be used as a model for any regulations. For
example, the social norm of creator empowerment could guide
Second Life’s potential codification of punishments for offensive
behavior. Instead of relying on the uncertainty of a real-world court
system in adjudicating the copyright claims that are beginning to
149
emerge in Second Life, a penal code created by Linden Lab could
146. See Second Life, Terms of Service, supra note 115 (“You agree that Linden Lab may
take whatever steps it deems necessary to abridge, or prevent behavior of any sort on the
Service in its sole discretion, without notice to you.”).
147. See id. (describing how both types of conduct are partially forbidden); see also Second
Life, Community Standards, supra note 42 (detailing how some regions in Second Life are
designated as “Mature” zones where adult activity can presumably occur in public).
148. See Portola Hills Cmty. Ass’n v. James, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 582–84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that unreasonable covenants and restrictions created by homeowner’s associations to
govern their communities are not enforceable equitable servitudes); Hidden Harbour Estates,
Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 181–82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (finding that a restrictive
covenant erected by a home owner’s association that is related to the “health, happiness, and
enjoyment of life of the various unit owners” can justifiably be enforced under a standard of
reasonableness).
149. Benjamin Duranske, Six Major Second Life Content Creators Sue Alleged Copyright
Infringer in NY Federal District Court, VIRTUALLY BLIND, Oct. 27, 2007,
http://virtuallyblind.com/2007/10/27/content-creators-sue-rase-kenzo (describing a copyright
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authorize explicit punishments such as account suspension for the
unauthorized copying of an individual’s creation. Linden Lab could
also find inspiration for future regulations in regulatory models
proposed and created by its residents. For instance, a Second Life
resident named James Miller created a proposed code to guide
conflict-resolution hearings between avatars when disputes emerged
150
in the virtual world. Although this user-created regulation may have
captured many of the objectives of the virtual reality, it likely failed to
take hold because of the size and heterogeneous nature of the
network. Therefore, implementing a system-wide regulatory scheme
would likely require a centralized institution with the means to reach
all Second Life users. The propagation of an explicit penal code,
arbitration system, or other legal mechanism would have the
additional effect of educating real-world courts about the important
norms or objectives in the virtual world, thereby increasing the
probability that an outside legal system would allocate property rights
justly.
No matter how powerful or elaborate the automated controls
are, and regardless of how sophisticated Second Life’s preestablished
rule structure becomes, there will likely always be individuals who
have the inclination to ignore the clear rules and the knowledge
necessary to tear down Linden’s code laws. When the fencing of
Linden’s automated code fails, the regulations of real-world authority
will be needed to effectively govern Second Life.
Before posing recommendations for how real-world regulatory
bodies could effectively aid in the governance of virtual worlds like
Second Life, it is useful to note that the presence of real-world
authority has been felt in cyber-realities before. Real-world
intervention in Second Life has not been direct, but instead felt
through the actions taken by Linden Lab in response to a potential
regulatory threat. For example, in 2007 Linden Lab closed all
gambling establishments in Second Life in an attempt to preempt
infringement case filed in 2007 in a federal district court in New York).
150. See Johnson, supra note 112 (setting forth a “conflict-resolution proposal featuring
about 50 separate articles, sections, and clauses. . . . [such as] ‘SECTION IV[:] A jury will meet
on a hidden, off-world island, owned and maintained by Linden Lab. . . . [and] equipped with a
number of simple Jury Meeting Rooms, suitable for a jury of 7 to meet, as well as interview
parties in disputes’”); see also Bryan Gardiner, Bank Failure in Second Life Leads to Calls for
Regulation,
WIRED,
Aug.
15,
2007,
http://www.wired.com/gaming/virtualworlds/
news/2007/08/virtual_bank (describing how the Second Life Exchange Commission, a usercreated entity modeled after the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, was created to
address allegations of fraud in the virtual reality’s nascent securities markets).
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potential regulations that could have resulted from an FBI
151
investigation. In other sites, real-world authorities have directly
regulated user conduct. For instance, police in Holland arrested a
young boy for theft after he broke into the virtual home of a user in
the cyber-reality “Habbo Hotel” and stole the virtual furniture in the
152
home.
Assuming government regulation of virtual realities is desirable,
the most pressing question becomes what level of intervention is
appropriate. The level of government regulation, like an attempt to
refine automated code controls or erect a more sophisticated set of
internal regulations, should be guided by the users’ social norms.
Entrepreneurship norms could guide the government in potentially
imposing some of the real-world regulations governing the law of
contracts—like the concept of promissory estoppel—to reduce
several of the risks associated with engaging in economic transactions
with other consumers in the virtual world. Such an imposition of realworld law could aid in furthering the objective of entrepreneurship in
Second Life and would likely be a desirable addition. Additionally,
digital legal protection similar to the provisions of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) may be needed to assist in
153
protecting Second Life’s automated code-based controls. Protection
similar to the DMCA would likely make it illegal for any individual to
hack or manipulate the computer code controlling the virtual world.
154
Thus, similar to Lessig’s fence analogy, a DMCA-like piece of realworld legislation would serve to protect the virtual world when its
code-based fences fail.
Even if real-world regulation is desirable, a regulatory presence
that is too oppressive should be avoided. Similar to the fracturing that
occurred after the government heavily regulated internet file-sharing
155
programs like the popular program “Napster,”
real-world
151. Duncan Riley, Second Life Bans Gambling Following FBI Investigation,
TECHCRUNCH, July 25, 2007, http://www.techcrunch.com/2007/07/25/second-life-bans-gamblingfollowing-fbi-investigation.
152. Robin Raskin, Virtual Theft, Real-World Punishment, YAHOO! TECH,, Nov. 16, 2007,
http://tech.yahoo.com/blogs/raskin/16052.
153. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006) (making it
illegal to use or disseminate technology that circumvents the digital protections placed on
copyrighted material).
154. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
155. See Viktor Mayer-Schönberger & John Crowley, Napster’s Second Life?: The
Regulatory Challenges of Virtual Worlds, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1775, 1780 (2006) (discussing how
the government’s attempt to forestall MP3-transferring sites like Napster failed and how the
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regulation could lead to the dissolution of Second Life. The
dissolution of Second Life could result from oppressive real world
regulation because users may become dissatisfied with the regulatory
yoke placed on their virtual experience and thus opt to leave the site
and either create their own smaller Second Life-like virtual worlds or
156
join another cyber-reality. This potential fracturing of Second Life
into a myriad of independent, smaller virtual worlds would ultimately
create a galaxy of cyber-realities too volatile and numerous to be
157
effectively governed by institutionalized real-world regulation.
158
Although some fragmentation may be desirable, decentralizing
virtual worlds would have the adverse effect of removing the
beneficial presence of the Leviathan-like head of the state, such as
Linden Labs in Second Life. Maintaining a singular head of the
virtual state is important because a single head of state can pool
resources to implement beneficial changes such as establishing a
system of uniform norms guiding participants’ interactions and can
create code systems defining the virtual world’s reality in such a way
that it betters the residents’ collective experience. Furthermore, the
virtual head of state can serve as a focal point in negotiating and
facilitating relations between the virtual world and real-world
regulators.
To improve the efficacy of social norms in Second Life, Linden
Lab should engage in reforms ranging from the institution of new
code-based tools to more comprehensive internal regulations to
perpetuate and protect the important objectives—creator
empowerment, respect and entrepreneurship—of the virtual reality.
If these measures fail, however, the authority and force of external
regulation may be needed to protect or further the objectives of
Second Life. Regardless of the scope of internal or external measures
taken to improve the conditions in Second Life, any action should
consider the important objectives that formed the core of the virtual
reality’s social norms.
web evolved to avoid this regulation by becoming a decentralized archipelago of file-transfer
sites too numerous to be regulated by the government).
156. Id.
157. See id. (predicting that a fracturing of virtual worlds would create a situation, similar to
the negative end result of the fracturing of file-sharing programs, in which it would be
impossible for governing bodies to effectively regulate the plethora of virtual worlds).
158. See CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 3–7 (2007) (explaining that, even though
fragmentation could have deleterious effects on free speech and the marketplace for ideas,
fragmentation does allow individuals to optimally follow and consume their particularized
interests).
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CONCLUSION
Because social norms alone cannot efficiently maximize
participant welfare in Second Life, real-world regulators will likely
have to expend valuable resources to help prevent and resolve cyber
conflicts. Although some may regard any allocation of state resources
to resolve this problem as a waste, there are several compelling
reasons why this society should not ignore Second Life or treat it as
merely a fad. The first is the immense size of Second Life’s virtual
population and economy. As of 2008, Second Life had over fifteen
million users who collectively spend more than twenty million dollars
159
in the virtual world every month. The massive exchange of realworld currency in this virtual reality has turned Second Life into a
discrete microeconomy that can cause real-world consequences. One
of the more pronounced real-world consequences was the havoc that
resulted from the virtual banking industry’s collapse in Second Life.
160
Following the financial missteps of one of Second Life’s banks,
Second Life users lost an estimated $750,000 in real-world money in
161
the virtual economy. Given that Linden Lab has refused to take
162
affirmative action to ameliorate the problem, the vacuum may need
to be filled by government regulation or the affected individuals will
be with left with no recourse.
Immediate concerns affecting the virtual reality of Second Life
are not the only reasons to pay attention to this cyber reality. Lessons
gleaned from Second Life can also be used to resolve conflicts in
other virtual realities. For instance, the failures and successes of social
norms examined in this Note could be used to help successfully
resolve a dispute that has emerged in the virtual reality of “World of
Warcraft” (WoW). WoW is a virtual world similar to Second Life in
which individual users can interact with each other and the virtual
163
three-dimensional environment in a real-time setting. WoW is
different than Second Life in that the virtual reality is based primarily
159. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
160. Duncan Riley, Virtual Banking Banned in Second Life, TECHCRUNCH, Jan. 8, 2008,
http://www.techcrunch.com/2008/01/08/virtual-banking-banned-in-second-life (describing how a
Second Life bank “Ginko Financial” offered Second Life residents Ponzi-like interest schemes
but ultimately had to declare itself insolvent).
161. Robin Sidel, Cheer Up, Ben: Your Economy Isn’t as Bad as This One, WALL ST. J., Jan.
23, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120104351064608025.html?mod=hpp_us_inside_today.
162. Id. (discussing how Linden Labs has done nothing to help the users reclaim their lost
money).
163. World of Warcraft Guide, supra note 19.
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upon a gamelike platform in which the world’s users focus primarily
on gaining combat experience, skills, and items to best each other and
164
to defeat the computer characters in the game. The conflict in WoW
that the lessons of Second Life can be used to resolve concerns a
complaint filed in a federal court by the operators of the virtual
165
world. The complaint alleges that a third-party program, called the
Glider, has tortiously interfered with the contracts between WoW and
166
its users. The real-world regulator being asked to resolve this
dispute, a federal court in Arizona, should consider the important
objectives and norms of the virtual world before rendering any
decisions. Following the social norm construct used by Ellickson in
167
his study of the Shasta cowboys, one of the important objectives of
WoW is to preserve the fairness of the gamelike environment of the
168
virtual world. If “fairness of the game” is an important norm of
WoW, the Glider program may be violating that norm because it
permits some participants in the game to manipulate the rules of the
169
world to create an unfair advantage. Consequently, the disruptive
nature of the Glider program, which may not be visible to an outsider,
affects the in-game experience for many users and thus makes it
difficult for WoW to deliver a satisfactory gaming experience to its
customers. The social-norm analysis that this Note invokes could aid
the federal court in determining how to efficiently and justly allocate
the entitlements in a case presenting unique issues in a context, which
a federal court may not clearly understand. The lessons that can be
gleaned from Second Life and the real-world impacts it has on
individuals are two reasons indicating why Second Life deserves
meaningful attention.

164. Id.
165. See Complaint at 2, MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-02555DGC (D. Ariz. filed Oct. 25, 2006).
166. Benjamin Duranske, WoW Glider Summary Judgment Motion Filed; Blizzard Exhibits
Include Castronova Expert Report, VIRTUALLY BLIND, Mar. 23, 2008, http://virtuallyblind.com/
2008/03/23/mdy-blizzard-motions. The Glider program is a piece of software that allows users to
“automate key tasks in World of Warcraft . . . . [allowing] users to . . . harvest resources and
generate high level characters without actually playing.” Id. Some individuals find the Glider
desirable because it allows users to accumulate these valuable commodities without having to
endure the labor and time other users expend to gathering these resources. Id.
167. See supra notes 69–74 and accompanying text.
168. See World of Warcraft, Terms of Use Agreement, supra note 87 (“Nonetheless, certain
acts go beyond what is ‘fair’ and are considered serious violations of these Terms of Use.”).
169. Edward Castronova, Effects of Botting on World of Warcraft 16–20 (unpublished
expert opinion, on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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As more attention is focused on Second Life and its virtual-world
kin, the democratically inspired norms that guide these virtual worlds
170
should not be forgotten. Following the advice of Judge Easterbrook,
the new regulators of these virtual worlds will not be good legal
trailblazers if they begin their pursuit blind to the objectives of this
new frontier.

170.

See supra note 1 and accompanying text.

